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North Carolina's Wary Reception of Drug
Treatment Court: The Myth of Inherent Ethics
Violations within its Structure
INTRODUCTION

Imagine that you are the Chief District Court Judge of a county in
North Carolina. On the bench for several years, you grow accustomed to
seeing many of the same non-violent criminal defendants in court. These
courthouse regulars vary from manual laborers, to students, to even
doctors. All of these people share one thing in common: they are addicts.
It becomes frustrating to continually sentence the same people to prison,
only to have them appear again at some point later. You grow tired of
watching peoples' addictions to drugs and alcohol thrust them into the
unforgiving and perpetual life of crime that the maintenance of addiction
necessitates. Prison time for these regulars appears futile. Extensive
periods of prison time seem to only avoid the problem temporarily, by
incarcerating the offender at great expense to the rest of society, until the
point where the individual is released back into the community and the
same repetitive cycle of crime.
Does a district court possess any power to aid these members of the
community? After research, it becomes apparent that North Carolina has
already identified a solution to your conundrum-drug treatment courts, a
judicial structure that mandates legal accountability, saves money, and
provides rehabilitative services for addiction. You cannot help but wonder,
however, why such a small percentage of North Carolina counties have a
drug treatment court.
After asking several local colleagues, the discovery is surprising:
some individuals react with enthusiastic praise of drug treatment courts
while others, with raised eyebrows, divulge that although drug treatment
courts are full of good intentions, they strive for an unobtainable goal.
Then, there are the few who react with an adamant disapproval of such an
avant-garde approach to the law, either with an assertion that latent ethical
violations inevitably exist within the drug court structure or with a skeptical
comment on the court's perspective that such a dubious set of people can
really "change." What is the explanation behind such a divided response?
Why is part of North Carolina's legal community resisting the newly
emerging paradigm of drug treatment courts?
367
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A. Drug Treatment Courts: An Alternative Approach to the Traditional
CriminalJustice System
Drug treatment courts ("DTCs") have operated in North Carolina
since 1995.1 Once a criminal defendant goes through an initial "screening"
with the assigned DTC staff member, and meets the local eligibility
requirements,2 the defendant has two options. First, the defendant may
plead guilty to the criminal charge,3 and instead of serving an extensive
prison sentence, may participate in a year-long, court-mandated regimen of
intensive substance abuse treatment, counseling, and other related
rehabilitative services. 4 Alternatively, the defendant may chose to forego
the option of therapeutic court and instead play the odds of traditional
criminal court.5 After an informed discussion with defense counsel, a
defendant who voluntarily elects to enter the DTC begins working on the
program's stated goals-graduation and sobriety.6 Generally, in order to
graduate a participant must: be nominated by the DTC team,7 be employed
and making payments toward legal obligations such as child support or

1. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-793 (2011).
2. A candidate will be selected if: (1) he or she is diagnosed by an appointed screening
staff member as either chemically dependent or borderline chemically dependent; (2) the
candidate can be immediately punished for the pending criminal charge; and (3) the
candidate meets all local eligibility requirements. Local requirements vary among courts
and are created by the Director of the Administrative Office of the Courts in conjunction
with the State Drug Treatment Court Advisory Committee. See DTC TARGETING DIRECTIVE
§ 3.1 (2011); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-797.
3. While most DTCs are structured as a post-plea program, some North Carolina
counties offer a pre-plea adult DTC program in addition to the typical post-plea adjudicative
structure; those counties are as follows: Forsyth, Guilford, Mecklenburg, Person, and
Caswell. See CHIEF JUSTICE I. BEVERLY LAKE, JR. & RALPH A. WALKER, N.C. ADMIN.
OFFICE OF THE COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT ON THE STATUS OF NORTH CAROLINA'S DRUG
COURTS,
2005-2006
Sess.,
at
31-32
(2005),
available at
TREATMENT

http://www.nccourts.org/Citizens/CPrograms/DTC/documents/NDlegRp2005.pdf.
4. Id at 2-4. Other rehabilitative services include education, vocational training,
employment skill development, and housing. See generally id.
5. See id. at 1.
6. See generally id.
7. OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DEFINING DRUG COURTS: THE
KEY COMPONENTS 1 (1997) [hereinafter "DEFINING DRUG COURTS"] ("Realization of these
goals requires a team approach, including cooperation and collaboration of the judges,

prosecutors, defense counsel, probation authorities, other corrections personnel ... an array
of local service providers, and the greater community.").
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restitution, receive clean drug tests during the prior three out of six
months, and successfully complete all required clinical treatment. 9
The unfortunate truth is that most DTC participants are no strangers to
the court system. Most DTC participants have past criminal charges due to
underlying substance abuse and mental health issues, in addition to prior

charges in various other courts such as truancy court, department of social
services court, or child support court. 10 By allowing the individual to
receive treatment for the underlying cause of the criminal behavior under
one judge in one court, DTC provides an alternative to the costly and timeconsuming task of having different judges and other legal actors oversee
each legal claim every time the individual is charged.
Indeed, a DTC judge has many functions, such as addressing the
various legal problems of each individual, providing therapeutic legal
solutions to those issues," and simultaneously maintaining a perspective of
the full breadth of the individual's legal problems. 12 The overall goal of
North Carolina's DTC is to break the cycle of addiction that propels repeat
criminal offenders. 3 DTC addresses the facts that incarceration alone does
very little to break an individual's perpetual cycle of drugs and crime and
that prison is a scarce resource that should be reserved for those who are
true threats to society-not people who could be safely dealt with outside

8. The treatment program generally involves the following phases: detoxification,
stabilization, aftercare, and educational counseling. See Hon. Peggy Fulton Hora et al.,
Therapeutic Jurisprudenceand the Drug Treatment Court Movement: Revolutionizing the
CriminalJustice System's Response to Drug Abuse and Crime in America, 74 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 439,475 (1999). Throughout the program, DTC staff will require the participant to
submit frequent and random urine samples for drug testing. Id.
9. DEFINING DRUG COURTS, supra note 7, at 11, 15.
10. Interview with Hon. Joseph M. Buckner, Chief Dist. Court Judge of Orange Cnty.,
N.C., in Hillsborough, N.C. (Jan. 2, 2013).
11. The type of sanctions given to a DTC participant serve to underscore the
therapeutic perspective: "A DTC's therapeutic orientation compels the court and its
participants to pursue and utilize relationships, methods, and ideas which will reinforce and
support the goal of getting the individual to stop using drugs." Hora et al., supra note 8, at
470.
12. See generally N.C. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, BEST PRACTICES FOR NORTH
CAROLINA DRUG TREATMENT COURTS (2010) [hereinafter "BEST PRACTICES"], available at

http://www.nccourts.org/Citizens/CPrograms/DTC/documents/dtcbestpractices.pdf.
13. LAKE & WALKER, supra note 3, at ii. Additional codified goals of DTC include
reducing alcohol dependency, reducing criminal and delinquent recidivism, reducing drug
and alcohol-related court workload, increasing the personal, familial and social
accountability of offenders, and promoting effective interaction and use of resources among
criminal personnel. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-792 (20121).
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of prison.14 Through the coordinated efforts of the judiciary, defense bar,
prosecution, and probation, DTC seeks to provide participants with the
intensive treatment necessary "to become healthy, law abiding and
productive family and community members."15
In fact, the benefits of DTC are twofold. Not only does the structure
of a specialized court increase judicial efficiency by removing those drugand alcohol-related charges from the court docket, it also reduces harm to
the community and criminal defendants.16 DTC minimizes criminal
activity, highway injuries and death, healthcare and social welfare costs,
domestic violence, and child abuse and neglect.17 Nationwide studies have
shown that DTC reduces criminal activity in the surrounding community
by as much as 45% more than traditional sentencing options while
producing cost-savings ranging from $3,000 to $13,000 per participant.' 8
These cost-savings include reduced prison costs, arrests, trials, and
victimization. '9 Other studies have concluded that "for every dollar spent
on treatment, about $7 . . . [is] saved, mainly in reduction of criminal
activity and in the hospitalizations for health problems." 20 The national
participation and retention rate in DTC programs stands at approximately
70%.21

The North Carolina DTC is modeled after the nation's very first drug
treatment court, which was instituted in Miami-Dade, Florida, in 1989, by

14. Hora et al., supra note 8, at 449.
15. Adult Drug Treatment Court, N.C. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS,
http://www.nccourts.org/Citizens/CPrograms/DTC/Adult/ (last visited May 1, 2013); see
LAKE & WALKER, supra note 3, at 59; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-791 ("The General Assembly
recognizes that a critical need exists in this State for judicial programs that will reduce the

incidence of alcohol and other drug abuse or dependence and crimes . .").
16. See Candace McCoy, The Politics ofProblem-Solving: An Overview of the Origins
and Development of Therapeutic Courts, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1513, 1518 (2003).
17. See About Us, RECOVERYNC, http://www.recoverync.org/about/ (last visited May 1,
2013).
18. Drug Courts Work, NAT'L Ass'N OF DRUG COURT PROF'LS, http://www.nadcp.org/
learn/facts-and-figures (last visited May 1, 2013).
19. Id.
20. Hora et al., supra note 8, at 503 (quoting CTR. FOR SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT,
U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., TREATMENT IMPROVEMENT PROTOCOL SERIES
No. 23, TREATMENT DRUG COURTS: INTEGRATING SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT WITH
LEGAL CASE PROCESSING 1, 44 (1996)).
21. Id. at 502. For North Carolina re-arrest and recidivism rates, generally, see AMY
CRADDOCK, NORTH CAROLINA DRUG TREATMENT COURT EVALUATION FINAL REPORT

(2002).
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the then-Chief Judge Wetherington of Florida's eleventh judicial district. 22
The reasoning of the court's establishment was such: "The same people are
picked up again and again until they end up in the state penitentiary and
take up space that should be used for violent offenders. The Drug Court
tackles the problem head-on." 23 The traditional, adversarial court model
simply perpetuated the problem because it was unable to address the fact
that substance abuse was an underlying cause of repetitive crime. Through
the treatment-oriented mindset of therapeutic court, Judge Wetherington
was able to create a judicial process that directly faced the root of the
The Miami-Dade court's approach of combining
criminal activity.
substance treatment with the Florida judiciary quickly became popular in
other states.24 As of June 30, 2012, the United States had 2,734 drug courts
operating within its territory.2 5
Overall, DTC in North Carolina has been relatively successful 26 in
producing sober and productive members of the community.2 7 So why are
there not more drug treatment courts? One of the prominent answers
provided by legal scholars in opposition to therapeutic courts, such as DTC,
is that the adjudicative structure places tension upon the role of a lawyer
that inevitably results in unethical professional conduct. 28 These opponents
allege that ethical violations necessarily flow from the relationship between
the collaborative interactions required by the court and the participating

22. Hora et al., supra note 8, at 454-55.
23. Id. at 455 (citation omitted).
24. What Are Drug Courts: Drug Court History, NAT'L Ass'N OF DRUG COURT
PROF'LS, http://www.nadcp.org/learn/what-are-drug-courts/drug-court-history (last visited
May 1, 2013).
25. Id.
26. For annual outcomes of North Carolina DTCs, see N.C. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE
COURTS, ANNUAL REPORTS ON NORTH CAROLINA'S DRUG TREATMENT COURTS (2003-2011),
available at http://www.nccourts.org/Citizens/CPrograms/DTC/Legislative.asp.
To view
biennial recidivism rates in North Carolina, including those of drug treatment courts, see
Research and Evaluation, N.C. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, http://www.nccourts.org/
Citizens/CPrograms/DTC/Research.asp (last visited May 1, 2013). For other alternative
dispute resolution models within the North Carolina judicial system, see N.C. ADMIN.
OFFICE OF THE COURTS, THE NORTH CAROLINA JUDICIAL SYSTEM 16 (2008), available at
http://www.nccourts.org/citizens/publications/documents/judicialsystem.pdf
27. See LAKE & WALKER, supra note 3, at 31.
28. See, e.g., Tamar M. Meekins, "Specialized Justice": The Over-Emergence of
Specialty Courts and the Threat of a New Criminal Defense Paradigm, 40 SUFFOLK U. L.
REv. 1, 2-3 (2006).
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lawyers' duties to their clients, raising particular concern with the role of
the criminal defense attorney.2 9
This Comment argues that the ethical argument against DTC is
significantly flawed. The opposition's logic rests on narrow definitions of
lawyers' ethical obligations that are simply incompatible with those
outlined in the North CarolinaRules ofProfessionalConduct ("NCRPC").
This argument also ignores the fact that these supposedly unethical
components of DTC are no different from those traditional components of
adversarial proceedings that have long-been recognized by the legal
community as ethical.
Indeed, the ethical violations alleged by opponents misconstrue the
true debate over North Carolina's DTC. This Comment posits that the real
reason for the legal community's hesitation in embracing DTC is not
simply a wariness to embrace a new and non-traditional paradigm in
criminal adjudication; rather, the opposition is based on a reluctance that
springs from the legal profession's historical unwillingness to deal with the
public health problem of substance abuse and the accompanying social
stigma of "addiction."
Part I of this Comment will provide the foundational concepts that
form the obligations of the modern-day lawyer. This will be an essential
portion that covers traditional theories of agency, fiduciary relationships,
zealous advocacy, confidentiality, and scope of authority. Additionally,
Part I will contain a brief discussion of how these theories are embodied
within the NCRPC.
Part II will briefly introduce the reader to the alternative dispute
resolution ("ADR") model and its underlying collaborative policies. This
discussion will also include an overview of the ADR subsections of
collaborative law and therapeutic justice, as well as a discussion of how
these models inevitably led to the creation of drug treatment courts.
In Part III, this Comment will specifically focus on the role of the
defense attorney within the unique collaborative approach of DTC
"staffmg" meetings, which are comprised of an open discussion of each
client's background information and membership in the program. This Part
will briefly outline how the defense attorney's role within these meetings
offers the client advantages unique to the non-adversarial system.
Part IV will directly address the class of legal scholarship that
contends that the structure of DTCs will inherently result in ethical
violations. Specifically, it will address and rebut the main claim of this
opposition argument-that the duties of a DTC lawyer impermissibly limit
29. Id at 6.
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the traditional obligations of zealous advocacy, confidentiality, and
prevention of a client's waiver of rights.
This Comment will conclude with the contention tha*t the legal
community's resistance to DTC is not due to any alleged ethical violations
but instead is a result of: (1) the legal profession's own issues with
substance abuse; (2) the fact that the "therapeutic courts" label is
essentially a dirty word to those who lack understanding of its structure or
goals; and (3) social misconceptions concerning the nature of addiction.
The Author implores North Carolina's legal community to reexamine its
approach to DTC in order to provide our communities with the vast
financial and social benefits that DTC has to offer.
I. THE ROLE OF A LAWYER: A NORTH CAROLINA PERSPECTIVE

The role of a North Carolina lawyer is largely shaped by traditional
notions of agency, fiduciary obligations, and the North Carolina Rules of
ProfessionalConduct ("NCRPC"). At a bare minimum, a lawyer owes his
client care, competence, and diligence in his work.
A.

The Lawyer as a FiduciaryAgent of the Client

In order to appreciate the principles underscoring the NCRPC, one
must have an understanding of the law of agency. Most agency principles
are either specifically codified in the NCRPC, or referenced in the
accompanying comments. 3 ' The law of agency provides the bedrock
principles of a lawyer's obligations to his clients. In the most basic terms,
agency law governs the relationship between an agent and a principal.32
The agent acts on behalf of the principal, for the sole benefit of the
principal, through the power vested in the agent by the principal.34 In
addition, an agent may also be vested with certain incidental powers
implied on the basis of necessity or custom. 35 The relationship between
agent and principal is a fiduciary one, 3 6 in which the agent is empowered

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
(1949).

§ 8.08 (2006).
See N.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1-1.7, 1.15 (2003).
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01.
Id.
2A C. J. S. Agency § 132 (2012).
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.02.
See Austin W. Scott, The Fiduciary Principle, 37 CALIF. L. REv. 539, 543-44
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY
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with all of the rights and responsibilities of the principal, as outlined in
their agreement to enter into the relationship. 7
The law of agency recognizes that the relationship between a lawyer
and a client is a fiduciary one: a relationship of the utmost trust where the
agent (the lawyer) owes the principal (the client) the highest standard of
care. 3 8 The fiduciary owes the client a duty of care, control, competence,
confidentiality, and loyalty. Implicit within a lawyer's duty of "care" is
the affirmative duty of diligence and safekeeping; this includes safekeeping
of the client's property as well as his confidences. 40
Likewise, inherent in the duty of "loyalty" is the lawyer's
responsibility to check for past, current, or potential conflicts with the
client's representation, to communicate promptly and effectively with the
client, and to account for the appropriate fees and expenses charged to the
client. 4 1 The lawyer is charged with these various affirmative obligations
in order to protect the client from overreaching by the attorney.4 2 In this
fiduciary relationship, the client places ultimate trust and risks significant
vulnerability by deferring to the attorney to solve the client's legal troubles.
In order to protect the client's interests from an abuse of power, the lawyer
is, therefore, held accountable by the traditional ethical obligations of
agency.
B. Zealous, But Honorable
Merriam-Webster's Dictionary defines the adjective "zealous" as

"marked by fervent partisanship for a person, a cause, or an ideal." 43 The
legal connotations of "zealous advocacy," however, have remained mainly
undefined. The terminology sections of both the ABA Model Rules of
ProfessionalConduct ("Model Rules") and the NCRPC are silent as to the
term "zealous," and although North Carolina case law often cites the duty,
37. Id.

38. See A. Gay Jenson Farms Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 309 N.W.2d 285, 290 (Minn. 1981)
("Agency is the fiduciary relationship that results from the manifestation of consent by one
person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his control, and consent
by the other so to act.").
39. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 8.01,8.08.
40. See N.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1, 1.3, 1.15 (2003).
41. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 8.07-8.12.
42. See, e.g., Lagen v. Balcor Co., 653 N.E.2d 968, 975 (Ill. Ct. App. 1995) ("A
fiduciary duty is the duty of an agent to treat his principal with the utmost candor, rectitude,
care, loyalty, and good faith-in fact to treat the principal as well as the agent would treat
himself.").
43. MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1455 (11th ed. 2004).
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it refrains from directly defining the term.4 So what does a lawyer's
obligation of "zealous advocacy" actually entail?
One common misconception is that a duty to "zealously represent" a
client should trump all other obligations-a skewed perception that zeal is
the one affirmative duty of a lawyer that must operate in the extreme.45
Conventional wisdom suggests that criminal defense attorneys may-as an
exception-be given more flexibility in pushing the limits of "zealousness"
because of the high-stakes nature of criminal charges. 46 However,
flexibility unequivocally does not stretch so far as to create an affirmative
duty to ignore all other fiduciary obligations for the sake of unwavering
zeal.
Rather, the obligation of "zealous advocacy" has historically been
subject to other countervailing interests. In fact, the concept of a limited
duty of zeal has been present since the days of the ABA Model Code of
Professional Responsibility ("Model Code"): 47 "The duty of a lawyer to
represent his client with zeal does not militate against his concurrent
obligation to treat with consideration all persons involved with the legal
process..

. .""

Under the heading of "Representing a Client Zealously,"

the Model Code further explains that a lawyer is expressly allowed to
exercise his professional judgment "to waive or fail to assert a right or
position of his client" via compliance with reasonable requests by opposing

44. Black's Law Dictionary does not define "zealous" alone but does define "zealous
witness" as follows: "A witness who shows partiality toward the litigant that called him or
her to testify and who seems eager to help that side in the lawsuit." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1741 (9th ed. 2009). This definition suggests that the "zealous" modifier
signifies a strong sense of partisanship. See also State v. Anderson, 513 S.E.2d 296, 306,
318 (N.C. 1999); State v. Locklear, 505 S.E.2d 277, 303 (N.C. 1998); In re K.G.L, 698 S.E.
2d 150, 154 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010).
45. See Allen K. Harris, The ProfessionalismCrisis-The 'Z' Words and Other Rambo
Tactics: The Conference of Chief Justices' Solution, 53 S.C. L. REv. 549, 569 (2002)
("Many attorneys believe that 'zealously representing their clients' means pushing all rules
of ethics and decency to the limit. The phrase 'zealous advocacy' is frequently invoked to
defend unprofessional behavior and a 'Rambo,' or 'win at all costs,' attitude.").
46. See N.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.1 cmt. 3 (2003) (exempting criminal
defense attorneys from the general rule regarding meritorious claims and contentions and
allowing them to force the prosecutor to establish every element of the criminal claim).
47. Before today's Model Rules, the ABA model was the 1969 Model Code, which was
preceded by the 1908 Canons of Professional Ethics. SUSAN R. MARTYN ET AL., THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS: NATIONAL RULES, STANDARDS,

STATUTES,

AND STATE LAWYER

CODES 1 (2012).

48.

MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY

EC 7-10 (1980) (emphasis added).
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counsel, in avoidance of using offensive tactics, or in an attempt to treat
with courtesy and consideration all persons involved in the legal process.49
Thus, while it is an important aspect of a lawyer's overall role, zeal is,
by no means, limitless. Reasonable checks on a lawyer's zeal have
traditionally been recognized by codes and rules that, over centuries, have
shaped doctrines of legal ethical responsibility. Whether these constraints
come in the form of civility to opposing counsel or of deference to a
coexisting duty, the absolutist perspective of "zealous advocacy" fails.so
The NCRPC mirrors this interpretation of "zealous" advocacy. A
lawyer is defined as a "representative of clients, an officer of the legal
system, and a public citizen having special responsibility for the quality of
justice."5' Placed within the context of the Preamble to the NCRPC, the
lawyer's overall role as a "representative of clients" is divided into five
subsections: (1) advisor, (2) advocate, (3) negotiator, (4) evaluator, and (5)
and third-party neutral. 5 2 As an "advocate," a lawyer "zealously" asserts
the client's position. 3 Significantly, however, the responsibility of zealous
advocacy is explicitly balanced against the joint obligations inherent in the
other duties of "officer of the court" and "public citizen." 54 The NCRPC
modifies the Model Rules (which simply read "zealous representation") to
"zealous but honorablerepresentation."55 The associated comments within
the NCRPC's Preamble emphasize that the addition of "honorable" is
intended to highlight the accompanying ethical expectation that an attorney
treat opposing counsel with dignity and respect-an indication that zeal
should, at times, be offset by other concrete ethical duties. 56
In sum, a North Carolina lawyer's duty of "zealous representation" is
satisfied by an attorney's expressed partisanship and support for the client's
position, balanced against the attorney's coordinate ethical obligations as

49. Id.atDR7-101.
50. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text. See also James M. Altman,
Considering the A.B.A.'s 1908 Canons of Ethics, 71 FORDHAM L. REv. 2395, 2400-01
(2003) ("Consistent with that deliberate limitation on the lawyer's zealous representation of
a client, the Committee placed less emphasis than did the Alabama Code on conflicts of
interest and the zealous defense of criminal defendants.").
51. N.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. 1.
52. Id. pmbl. 2-3.
53. Id pmbl. 2.
54. Id. pmbl. 1.
55. Id. pmbl. 13 (emphasis added);

cf

MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY pmbl.

(1983) (containing no modification to the term "zealous").
56. See N.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. 13.
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set forth in the NCRPC. 5 As seen above, a no-holds-barred perspective of
zealous representation runs counter to traditional interpretations of
professional ethics and is, therefore, flawed.
C.

Confidentiality

The label "confidential information" casts a wide net over several
forms of information obtained by an attorney during representation. A
widely established understanding of "confidential information" is that it
refers to information relating to professional representation of the client
that is not otherwise generally known,58 or information that the client
specifically asks the lawyer to keep private (i.e., "client confidences or
secrets"). 59 A lawyer has an affirmative duty to refrain from either using or
revealing such confidential client information. 6 0 The NCRPC further
narrows this definition to information that was "acquired during the
professional relationship" 6 1-rather than using the same "relating to"
language as expressed in the Model Rules. 6 2
In line with traditional concepts of confidentiality, the NCRPC
charges an attorney with keeping this information from any type of
disclosure, intentional or inadvertent, and from using the information to
adversely affect the client.6 3 A lawyer is prohibited from revealing
information acquired through the professional relationship with a client
unless: (i) such disclosure is implicitly authorized in the representation of
57. See, e.g., Sherrill Colvin, Professionalism: Redefining the Lawyer's Role, 47 RES
GESTAE 5, 5 (June 2004) ("[Z]ealous advocacy is constrained by a responsibility, not just to
the client, but also to society. ... Other considerations must be taken into account, including
preservation of the legal system as a venerable means to dispense justice.").
58. Information falls into this unprotected category if it is generally known in the
relevant sector of the public or "obtainable through publicly available indexes and similar
methods of access." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 59 (2000).
59. See N.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. 11; see also MODEL CODE OF PROF'L
RESPONSIBILITY Canon 4 (1980) ("A Lawyer Should Preserve the Confidences and Secrets
of a Client").
60. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 60 cmt. j ("The
strict confidentiality duty .

.

. is warranted for prophylactic purposes.

. .

. There is no

important social interest in permitting lawyers to make unconsented use or revelation of
confidential client information for self-enrichment.").
61. N.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (emphasis added).
62. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (1983).
63. See N.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) cmt. 17; see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.05 (2006) (stating that a lawyer, as the agent of her client, has a duty
"not to use or communicate confidential information of the [client] for the agent's own
purposes or those of a third party").

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2014

11

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 3 [2014], Art. 5

378

CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:367

the client; 64 (ii) the client gives informed consent; or (iii) the disclosure
falls within one of the exceptions enumerated in Rule 1.6.65 In the interest
of fairness, the justifications underpinning the exceptions to the duty of
confidentiality reflect the common sense understanding that a lawyer
should be permitted to prevent serious harm to a third party, protect
himself, protect his client, and advance the client's interests in the
representation, all at the cost of revealing only that confidential information
necessary for such protection.6 6
In line with this reasoning, a lawyer may elect to make an authorized
disclosure of the client's confidential information even without the client's
consent.67 Note the language in Rule 1.6: "[U]nless the client gives
informed consent, the disclosure is impliedly authorized in order to carry
out the representation or the disclosure is permitted by paragraph (b)."68
The "or" indicates that the lawyer may disclose the confidential
information for any of those reasons, and therefore, the client's informed
consent is not a mandatory prerequisite for an authorized disclosure or a
Rule 1.6(b) disclosure. 69 Under the NCRPC, a lawyer may, therefore,
make confidential disclosures to the extent that they are incidental to
carrying out the representation of the client, including a disclosure that
facilitates a satisfactory conclusion to the matter, regardless of the client's
64. A lawyer is impliedly authorized to reveal confidential information if the disclosure
is "appropriate in carrying out the representation." N.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R 1.6
cmt 5. This includes a broad category of circumstances such as admitting a fact that cannot
be properly disputed or when lawyers in a firm disclose to each other information about a
client to the entire firm. See id.
65. See id. R. 1.6. A lawyer may also reveal confidential information if it is necessary
to comply with other rules of conduct, such as the responsibility of candor to the tribunal or
the duty to be truthful in statements to others. See, e.g., id. R. 3.3 ("Candor Toward the
Tribunal"); id. R. 4.1 ("Truthfulness in Statements to Others"); id. R. 1.13 ("Organization
As Client"). Most of the exceptions to the prohibition against revealing confidential
information enumerated in the NCRPC are almost identical to those proposed by Rules
1.6(a) and 1.6(b) of the Model Rules. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R 1.6(a), (b).
66. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 61 cmt. b (2000);
see also N.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt 5 (noting that a lawyer is "impliedly
authorized to make disclosures about a client when appropriate in carrying out the
representation").
67. See N.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b); see also Memorandum of
Understanding, Orange Cnty. Pilot Drug Treatment Court 4 (Oct. 15, 2004), available at
http://www.dtcintranet.nccourts.org/documents/Resources/Orange/Adult/dtcmourevised2.doc (highlighting the expectation of a public defender to "explain[] all of the rights
that the defendant will temporarily or permanently relinquish").
68. N.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (emphasis added).

69. See id.
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consent.70 A more in-depth discussion of NCRPC's definition of an
"authorized disclosure" will be laid out in Part TV of this Comment.
D. Allocation ofAuthority and How North CarolinaMakes Room for a
CollaborativeApproach
According to Rule 1.2 of the NCRPC, a client ultimately controls the
objectives of the representation.7 1 The lawyer has control over the means
of reaching those objectives as long as the client is informed and the means
are objectively reasonable.7 2 Common sense dictates this allocation of
authority between client and lawyer-people hire lawyers for their legal
expertise and experience, and therefore, it is logical to defer to the lawyer's
judgment on strategy and other methods of achieving the client's overall
goal.
Because of legal expertise, a lawyer has the ultimate authority to make
decisions that the lawyer reasonably believes are required either by law or
the tribunal.
These types of judgment calls by the lawyer are usually
allowed on the condition that either the lawyer consults with his client or
the action is subsequently ratified by the client.74 These decisions fall
within the recognized exceptions to Rule 1.2. In the same right, the client
has the last word on matters of plea agreements, jury trials, and whether or
70. This implied authorization is obviously subject to the limitations of the scope of
authority that a lawyer possesses during a representation under Rule 1.2 of the NCRPC. See
id. R. 1.2 (discussing "Scope of Representation"). However, the language of Rule 1.6
accommodates for a lawyer's professional and reasonable belief that a confidential
disclosure is authorized, or necessary, instead of operating as a blatant prohibition. See id.
R. 1.6; see also MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-7 (1983) ("In certain areas of
legal representation not affecting the merits of the cause or substantially prejudicing the
rights of a client, a lawyer is entitled to make decisions on his own.").
71. N.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a).
72. See id. R. 1.2 cmts. 1, 7.
73. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 23 (2000). The
section states, in pertinent part:
As between client and lawyer, a lawyer retains authority that may not be
overridden by a contract with or an instruction from the client . . . to make
decisions or take actions in the representation that the lawyer reasonably believes
to be required by law or an order of a tribunal.
Id.
74. See id. § 21.
75. See N.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) cmt. 3 ("At the outset of a
representation, the client may authorize the lawyer to take specific action on the client's
behalf without the need for further consultation.
Absent a material change in
circumstances . . ,a lawyer may rely on such an advance authorization.").
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not to testify; this is appropriate given that these decisions have the most
potential to significantly influence whether or not the client will be
successful in his overall intended end.7 6
Moreover, it is significant to note that North Carolina has placed an
additional emphasis on attorneys' expected cooperation with all other legal
actors in the same proceeding 7 7-an emphasis absent from the Model
Rules. As emphasized earlier, North Carolina diverges from the Model
Rules so much as to allow a lawyer the choice to refrain from advocating a
position of his client, without client permission, if doing so would not
prevent or unduly burden the pursuit of the overall legal objective.
The
predominant rationale for the NCRPC's modification is the importance of
collaboration. "Lawyers are encouraged to treat opposing counsel with
courtesy and to cooperate with opposing counsel when it will not prevent
or unduly hinder the pursuit of the objective of the representation." 79 To
the extent that the client's interests are not substantially burdened, a lawyer
is effectively encouraged to take actions in the interest of fostering civility
and collaboration.
II. THE REALM OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION

In order to understand the unique role of the DTC attorney, one must
first have a grasp on the alternative dispute resolution ("ADR") approach to
the role of a lawyer. Within the ADR model, cases are sought to be
resolved short of a full-blown trial.80 Through these methods, ADR fosters
and enhances relations between parties by offering more opportunities for
input during the overall process.81

76. See id. R. 1.2(a)(1).
77. See, e.g., id. R. 1.2(a)(2). The NCRPC states that
A lawyer does not violate this rule by acceding to reasonable requests of opposing
counsel that do not prejudice the rights of a client, by being punctual in fulfilling
all professional commitments, by avoiding offensive tactics, or by treating with
courtesy and consideration all persons involved in the legal process.
Id.
78. See id. R. 1.2 cmt. 1.
79. Id.
80. See 1 JAY GRENIG, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION § 1:1 (3d ed. 2012).
81. See id.; see generally JEROLD S. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW?: RESOLVING
DISPUTES WITHOUT LAWYERS (1st ed. 1983) (providing an in-depth discussion on the
historical development of alternatives to formal adversarial processes).
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The umbrella of ADR incorporates various methods,82 including the
process of "collaborative law."" Under the collaborative law system, a
lawyer encompasses all of the principles found in the adversarial systemfiduciary duties, competence, diligence, and confidentiality-but there is an
additional heightened expectation of cooperation and discussion with other
This additional level of
legal actors involved in the proceeding.84
cooperation is partly due to the fact that the lawyers are no longer pitted
directly against each other as in an adversarial system; rather they are
working along with the prosecution, judge, and opposing party in an effort
to reach the client's objective of the representation.8 5 The lawyers in a
collaborative approach are advocates and creative problem-solvers that are
given flexibility to reach their clients' goals. This model is premised on the
combination of an overriding commitment to settlement outside of the
traditional adversarial litigation scheme and an individualized focus on
legal advocacy. The bottom line of both collaborative law and ADR is
simply that the systems seek an outcome that is seemingly less destructive
to human relationships than an adversarial system, all while encouraging
civility, compromise, and mutual respect.8
Within the collaborative outlook, the dynamic of the attorney-client
relationship is admittedly different from the adversarial process. Here, the
lawyer is the bearer of information concerning the available alternatives,
processes, law, and potential consequences of the client's ultimate decision,
essentially leaving the control of selecting both the process and the
outcome entirely with the client. Zealous advocacy remains present

82. With the effectiveness of DTC, it is no surprise that other ADR methods of
adjudication are instituted in North Carolina-mediation, family financial settlement
programs, court-ordered arbitration, mini trials, summary trials, and collaborative law
proceedings are just a few of the many examples of ADR that are alive and well in North
Carolina's judicial practice. See Special Courts, N.C. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS,
http://www.nccourts.org/Courts/Trial/Special/Default.asp (last visited May 1, 2013);
Councils and Commissions, N.C. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, http://www.nccourts.org/
Courts/CRS/Councils/Default.asp (last visited May 1, 2013).
83. GRENIG, supranote 80, § 2:74.
84. See generally Andrea K. Schneider, The Intersection of TherapeuticJurisprudence,
PreventativeLaw, and Alternative Dispute Resolution, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 1084,
1085-89 (1999).
85. BEST PRACTICES, supra note 12, at 19.
86. Larry R. Spain, Collaborative Law: A Critical Reflection on Whether a
Collaborative Orientation Can be Ethically Incorporated into the Practice of Law, 56
BAYLOR L. REV. 141, 143 (2004).

87. See Douglas H. Yarn, The Attorney as Duelist's Friend: Lessons From the Code
Duello, 51 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 69, 73-77 (2000).
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because it is a representation requirement that applies to all advocates.
Within the collaborative framework, zealous advocacy results when the
client elects to "direct the attorney in a specific and explicit fashion as to
the objectives of representation, and the [collaborative law] means by
which those objectives are to be pursued." 89 The collaborative lawyer
remains free, therefore, to zealously advocate for his client while still
operating within a cooperative structure.
Similarly, in collaborative law, there is an "'absolute commitment' on
the part of 'each attorney and party to negotiate a mutually agreeable
settlement,"' 90 comparable to the traditional win-win balance that has long
been familiar in mediation proceedings. While a collaborative lawyer will
likely have alliances with a multitude of legal players, this does not detract
from the lawyer's obligations to his client. Rather, those connections that
were previously viewed as "obstacles" to the client when in adversarial
processes are now transformed into unique opportunities for the client to
favorably meet the objective of the representation. 9 1 Due to the
collaborative law structure, the client's opposing party has already
committed himself to a collective approach toward settling the dispute with
the client. In the context of a criminal charge, the favorable advantages to
a client are significant-the prosecuting attorney and the judge are bound
to be willing to negotiate and consult with the client in order to reach a
mutually satisfactory end to the issue.9 2
A further subsection of collaborative law is "therapeutic
jurisprudence."
Therapeutic jurisprudence focuses on the sociopsychological ways in which legal processes affect individual citizens
involved in the justice system. 9 3 Under this paradigm, the law operates as a
therapeutic agent and a tool for seeking information needed to promote
certain laws or legal processes. 94 When utilized in a court structure,
therapeutic jurisprudence implements an individualized treatment plan that

88. See Sandra S. Beckwith & Sherri G. Slovin, The Collaborative Lawyer as
Advocate: A Response, 18 OHIO ST. J.ON Disp. RESOL. 497, 498 (2003).
89. GRENIG, supra note 80, § 21:60.
90. Beckwith & Slovin, supra note 88, at 499 (quoting Patricia Gearity, ADR and
CollaborativeLawyering in Family Law, MD. BAR JOURNAL, May-June 2002, at 2, 7).
91. See Hora et al., supranote 8, at 469.
92. Id. ("DTCs exist as 'a marriage between communities that have been traditionally at
odds and foreign to each other."' (quoting DRUG STRATEGIES, CUTTING CRIME: DRUG
(1997), available at http://www.drugstrategies.com/pdf/
COURTS IN AcTION 21
CuttingCrime97.pdf)).
93. Id. at 444.
94. Id.
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identifies the antecedent causes for a participant's legal issues and then
seeks to overcome these antecedent causes with constant monitoring and
encouragement from the court.95
III. THE DRUG TREATMENT COURT ATTORNEY
An illustration of the collaborative law/therapeutic jurisprudence
perspective on the role of a lawyer can be found within the unique
collaborative approach of North Carolina's DTC "staffing meetings,"
which occur prior to the opening session of a drug treatment court and after
a participant has already voluntarily entered the program.96 The meetings
consist of an open discussion of each client's information and membership
in the DTC program.9 7
Indeed, staffing meetings begin with a roster of all participants'
names, listing the months of sobriety, most recent criminal charges, and
health reports since entering the program. 9 8 This information is available to
only those authorized meeting attendees and the client; no other drug court
participants or third parties are given access to the content of the staffing
meeting discussions. 99 Decisions concerning the client's progress in the
program and consequences for noncompliance are discussed amongst the
judge, defense attorney, assistant district attorney, probation officer,
guardian ad litem, the DTC court coordinator, and the client's assigned
mental health or substance abuse counselor. iQo
Next, participants give their perspective on the improvement, if any,
of the participant, as well as their professional opinion concerning the
client's progress; the discussion focuses on which particular treatment
methods should be implemented in order for each individual to reach the
asserted end goal of sobriety and DTC graduation.' 0 For the probation

95. McCoy, supra note 16, at 1518.
96. See Interview with Hon. Joseph M. Buckner, Chief Dist. Court Judge, Orange
Cnty., N.C., in Hillsborough, N.C. (Jan. 2, 2013).
97. See id.; see also Interview with Marie Lamoureaux, Programs and Special Projects
Manager for Orange Cnty. Drug Treatment Court, in Hillsborough, N.C. (Mar. 4, 2013).
98. N.C. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, THE MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR THE NORTH
CAROLINA DRUG TREATMENT COURTS (2010) [hereinafter MINIMUM STANDARDS], available
at http://www.nccourts.org/Citizens/CPrograms/DTC/documents/dtcguidelines.pdf.

99. See Interview with Marie Lamoureaux, Programs and Special Projects Manager for
Orange Cnty. Drug Treatment Court, in Hillsborough, N.C. (Mar. 4, 2013).
100. BEST PRACTICES, supra note 12, at 4-6.
101. Hora et al., supra note 8, at 469 ("DTC proceedings focus on the treatment needs of
the offender and not the legal formalism of traditional courts.").
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officer, this suggestion may be a work placement program so that the
participant can pay off his remaining debts. For the drug counselor, this
proposal may be for more group therapy sessions to help the participant
deal with trust issues. Staffing meetings conclude with the decisions to
impose either graduated sanctions or incentives upon each DTC participant
in order to help stimulate the movement through the drug treatment
process. 102
Notably, the defense attorney is the only staffing meeting attendee
who plays a significantly different role from the rest. 0 3 As the others offer
compliance updates and professional opinions, the defense attorney
continues to operate as his client's representative by responding to each
suggested plan in alliance with his client's objective of sobriety and DTC
graduation. The defense attorney articulates the client's wishes in terms of
the methods used to reach that goal.
In fact, the staffing meeting gives the client a great advantage that
cannot be similarly offered in a traditional criminal case. Rather than take
the gamble of criminal court,10 4 the client has volunteered to allow his
defense attorney to advocate and bargain for the client while the client
receives care for underlying substance abuse problems. In the same vein,
the cooperative atmosphere of the staffing meetings gives defense attorneys
greater ability to both convince a prosecutor to dismiss any outstanding
criminal charges against the client for lack of probable cause and to also
suggest the methods of treatment most favored by the client. The defense
attorney is also given a unique chance to openly and directly address
allegations against the client, as compared to the typical adversarial setting.
For example, during a staffing meeting, one of the client's treatment
providers may allege that the client violated curfew last week. Even before
the group begins addressing proper sanctions for the client, the defense
counsel has the opportunity to ask questions of the treatment provider,
probation officer, and the DTC coordinator to get to the bottom of the
problem. Because of the various sources of information present at staffing

102. Randy Monchik, North Carolina Drug Treatment Court Program, NORTH
CAROLINA LAWYER ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, http://www.nclap.org/article.asp?articleid=150
(last visited May 1, 2013).
103. See MINIMUM STANDARDS, supra note 98, at 28. A defense attorney signs this
memorandum that specifically articulates that the lawyer's duty to the DTC client is to
"[a]dvocate for the rights and best outcomes for the offender" and to "[a]id in the
achievement of the offenders' long-range rehabilitative goals." Id.
104. It is important to note that the DTC defense attorney will still identify cases in
which charges should be dropped for lack of probable cause. See Hora et al., supra note 8,
at 479. A DTC lawyer is by no means stripped of his advocating abilities. Id.
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meetings, the defense counsel is able to double-check the legitimacy of the
sanctions imposed on her client with accuracy and efficiency.
IV. THE MYTH OF ETHICS VIOLATIONS INHERENT WITHIN THE DTC
STRUCTURE

DTC undoubtedly provides North Carolina communities with a
plethora of social and financial benefits. Despite these numerous benefits,
however, some of North Carolina's legal community still resist embracing
this newly emerging legal paradigm. Most negative responses to DTC are
premised on the myth that the DTC adjudicative structure inevitably results
in ethical violations.os There exists a specific class of legal scholarship
that contributes to this misconception.10 6 This particular class argues that
the collaborative role of the lawyer present in therapeutic courts limits the
traditional concept of a lawyer's ethical obligations.10 7 This legal
philosophy is premised on the idea that the duties of a collaborative law
attorney impermissibly limit the obligations of zealous advocacy,
confidentiality, and prevention of a client's waiver of rights. This
Comment rebuts each of these claims, in turn.
A. Public Citizen-A Vital Characterof the Ethical Lawyer Overlooked
by Opponents
Opponents to therapeutic courts believe that the very essence of the
structure over-promotes the role of the "peacemaker" at the cost of the
zealous advocate. 08 Zeal and a cooperative adjudicative structure are
presumed to be inherently in discord and, thus, impossible to balance.
The first error in this logic is the presumption that "zealous advocacy"
is an absolute license to madcap zeal-a duty unfaltering to any other
ethical obligation. This view is blatantly incompatible with the "zealous
advocacy" encouraged in the NCRPC. As mentioned earlier, the NCRPC
charges a lawyer with three equally important roles: (1) "representative of
clients," (2) "officer of the legal system," and (3) "public citizen." 09

105. See, e.g., Spain, supra note 86, at 148.
106. See, e.g., id
107. See generally Mae C. Quinn, Whose Team Am I on Anyway? Musings of a Public
Defender About Drug Treatment Court Practice, 26 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 37
(2000) (questioning the likelihood that drug treatment courts comport with traditional
ethical standards of criminal defense attorneys).
108. See, e.g., Meekins, supra note 28, at 3.
109. N.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. 1 (2006).
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Within the various obligations of a "public citizen" lies the lawyer's
duty to aid the public interest. A lawyer must use his skills to help citizens
0 For
reach their goals by navigating their way through the justice system.o"
instance, the NCRPC provides that a lawyer "should devote professional
time and resources and use civic influence to ensure equal access to our
system of justice for all those who ... cannot afford or secure adequate
legal counsel.""' Additionally, a lawyer should "aid the legal profession in
pursuing these objectives and should help the bar regulate itself in the
public interest."ll 2 The NCRPC further emphasizes that the legal
profession is a group of people who are united in a "learned calling for a
public good."l'
The NCRPC, therefore, specifically encourages the
collaboration and cooperation among all legal actors of a proceeding.
In the interest of fostering cooperation among members of the bar, the
lawyer should provide "zealous but honorable representation."ll 4 Zealous
representation, therefore, is broad enough to encompass collaborative
action. The position of absolute zeal not only ignores North Carolina's
position on a "zealous but honorable" lawyer but also flies in the face of
the lawyer's equally important role as a "public citizen" who works for the
public welfare and reputation of the profession.
In contrast, the role of the "public citizen" is alive and well in North
Carolina's DTC. By aiding the citizens of the community with substance
abuse treatment, providing solutions to criminal legal troubles, and
protecting the safety and health of the rest of society, the DTC lawyer is
fulfilling the duties of the "public citizen" as outlined by the NCRPC.
Simultaneously, the zealous but honorable defense attorney effectively
fosters civility amongst his colleagues while advocating for the client's
interest in sobriety and DTC graduation.
B. Authorized Disclosuresof ConfidentialInformation within the
Therapeutic Court Scheme

Critics
cooperative
tendency to
assume that
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

of therapeutic courts further contend that the types of
discussions encouraged among DTC professionals breed a
unethically disclose confidential information. " Opponents
it is impossible for a lawyer within a therapeutic court setting

Id. at 6.
Id.
Id. pmbl. 6.
Id. pmbl. 8.
Id. pmbl. 13.
See Quinn, supra note 107, at 56-58.
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to comply with the responsibility of confidentiality because the
collaborative efforts allegedly necessitate disclosure not protected under
Rule 1.6 of the NCRPC. However, nothing could be further from the truth.
For opponents, the ethical argument arises when the interest of the
client allegedly conflicts with what the team determines to be in the best
interest of the client. The hypothetical most often used to highlight this
situation goes as follows: During a staffing meeting, a discussion of a
participant named "Adam"' 16 arises. Adam, a client of the defense
attorney, has tested positive on last week's random drug test. After much
deliberation with the defense attorney, the DTC "team," as a whole, renders
its decision. Adam will be sent to jail for forty-eight hours as a
consequence, but he will be allowed to remain in the DTC program. Is it
ethically permissible for a defense attorney to participate in such a
collective adjudication of Adam's forty-eight-hour jail stint?
Yes. First, it is immediately important to remember that within the
specific context of DTC, the client volunteered to participate only after an
informed explanation of the program, its risks, and available alternatives.1 "
With knowledge of the DTC's procedure, the client agreed to authorize the
attorney to represent the client throughout the program." 8 Note that under
the NCRPC, the client may authorize the lawyer to take specific action on
the client's behalf at the outset of representation without the need for
further consultation." 9 Absent a material change in circumstances, a
lawyer may rely on such an advance authorization.1 2 0 Adam's DTC
attorney, therefore, may rely on Adam's initial authorization of disclosure
to the extent necessary to advance his ultimate goal of sobriety and DTC
graduation.
Second, DTC's procedural safeguards protect against potentially
unethical confidentiality disclosures by Adam's defense attorney by
requiring Adam's informed consent.121 DTC protocol requires the client's
attorney to counsel the client about the DTC model and what a court
outcome might look like for the client.122 The legal consequences of
116. A hypothetical name is given here.
117. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
118. The informed DTC participant has agreed to the stated objective of sobriety and
graduation, instead of a particular legal outcome. See Hora et al., supranote 8, at 469.
119. See N.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2.
120. Id. R. 1.2(a) cmt. 3.
121. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
122. For many of North Carolina's DTC programs, the public defender's office must
sign a memorandum pledging to advise its client as to the nature, purpose, and consequences
of DTC, the rights the client will relinquish, and a discussion of other legal options. See,
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volunteering to undergo DTC are contrasted with the likely outcome of
traditional criminal court. The client is also shown the court's sanctions
grid, which lists specific types of unacceptable behavior and the
corresponding sanction that will be imposed.123 The client is, therefore,
well aware of the possible reprimands in store if there are behavioral issues.
This voluntary election only occurs after an informed discussion of the
risks, procedures, and objectives of the program. By selecting DTC under
these procedures, the client has given informed consent for the lawyer to
employ his legal expertise to keep the client within the program until
sobriety and graduation. 12 4 This perspective is bolstered by a North
Carolina Ethics Opinion, which suggests that the collaborative structure of
various models of alternative dispute resolutions comply with professional
ethical standards as long as the client is aware of the court procedures and
gives informed consent.12 5 Since the DTC structure provides for the
client's informed consent at the very outset of the program, the staffing
meeting disclosures alluded to by opposition fall within the "informed
consent" exception to the rule of confidentiality.1 26

e.g., Memorandum of Understanding, Orange Cnty. Pilot Drug Treatment Court 4 (Oct. 15,
2004), available at http://www.dtcintranet.nccourts.org/documents/Resources/Orange/
Adult/dtcmou-revised2.doc.
123. The sanctions grid attempts to ensure equal treatment amongst DTC participants; it
holds the DTC Team members to their own guidelines in order to ensure that each instance
of impermissible behavior is met with the same range of sanctions, regardless of who the
person is. See Interview with Marie Lamoureaux, Programs and Special Projects Manager
for Orange Cnty. Drug Treatment Court, in Hillsborough, N.C. (Mar. 4, 2013). Examples of
unacceptable behavior are testing positive for drug tests, missing required treatment or
support groups, curfew violations, or any other noncompliance with court requirements. Id.
Some examples of sanctions include additional community service, a writing assignment to
be read before the DTC judge, or a short twenty-four- to forty-eight-hour "dip" in jail. Id.
124. See Hora et al., supra note 8, at 523 ("Before treatment was available to criminal
defendants through DTCs, defense counsel's job was to minimize harm through reduction in
incarceration. With DTCs, defense counsels' job evolves into a total improvement of the
lives of their clients."); see also N.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.0(f) ("'Informed
consent' denotes the agreement by a person to a proposed course of conduct after the lawyer
has communicated adequate information and explanation appropriate to the
circumstances.").
125. Ethics Comm., N.C. State Bar, RPC 107 (1991) [hereinafter N.C. Ethics Comm.],
available at http://www.ncbar.com/ethics/ethics.asp?pagel 14&keywords=6
("Such
agreements would be appropriate assuming that the nature of the alternative dispute
resolution procedures is fully disclosed to the client and the client is given full opportunity
to consult independent counsel relative to the wisdom of foregoing other possible remedies
in favor of alternative dispute resolution.").
126. N.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a).
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Alternatively, even if the procedural safeguards were absent from
DTC, the disclosures suggested above nonetheless fall within the NCRPC's
"impliedly authorized" exception to confidentiality.1 27 The language of
Rule 1.6 specifies that "a lawyer may be impliedly authorized to admit a
fact that cannot properly be disputed," and additionally, may make any
"disclosure that facilitates a satisfactory conclusion to a matter."' 28
In fact, the types of disclosures most often noted by therapeutic court
opponents fall squarely within both of the specified exceptions in Rule 1.6.
For instance, as indicated by the hypothetical discussed above, information
such as a client's criminal backgroundl 2 9 is often discussed by the DTC
team because it is a factor taken into consideration when determining what
type of treatment should be offered to the participant, if housing should be
provided, and what type of job placement programs should be utilized.130
Acknowledgment by the defense attorney of such a criminal background is
hardly an unethical confidential disclosure. The criminal background,
attainable with any public document search, is easily produced by the
prosecutor. Legal research databases (e.g., Westlaw or LexisNexis)
provide prosecutors with an accurate and ready determination of an
individual's background and are accurate beyond a reasonable question.' 3 1
Taking notice of a client's criminal background and then steering the
discussion of various treatment options available to the client clearly falls

127. Id. R. 1.6 cmt. 5.
128. Id.
129. The defense attorney does not typically provide this information. Rather, the
district attorney or assistant district attorney at the staffing meeting will typically just pull up
the client's criminal information on the computer via the district attorney's information
database network. Interview with Hon. Joseph M. Buckner, Chief Dist. Court Judge,
Orange Cnty., N.C., in Hillsborough, N.C. (Jan. 2,2013).
130. Id.
131. Although under no legal duty to respond to questions about a client's criminal
background, a lawyer may certainly acknowledge the client's record. A lawyer is prohibited
from disclosing the record but not from accepting a district attorney's production of the
record. See N.C. Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 5 (1998) (emphasizing that a "lawyer may not
reveal confidential information about a client's prior criminal record to the court but may
not misrepresent the client's criminal record') (emphasis added) (citing Ethics Comm.,
N.C. State Bar, RPC 33); Ethics Comm., N.C. State Bar, RPC 33 (1988) ("Obviously, trial
court events may give rise to a conflict between this duty to deal honestly with the court,
and the duty to deal confidentially with the client . . . in response to a specific and direct
question to counsel by the court, counsel may not misrepresent the defendant's criminal
record. . . .") (emphasis added).
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within the parameters of "admi[ssion] of a fact that cannot be properly

disputed."1 32
Additionally, a lawyer is impliedly authorized to disclose confidential
information that "facilitates a satisfactory conclusion to a matter."' 33 This
language suggests a rational relation between the means (method of
disclosure) and the ends (the satisfactory conclusion of sobriety and
graduation as elected by the client). Since the client ultimately controls the
objective of representation and has chosen to pursue the express program
objective of sobriety and DTC graduation, most disclosures that meet this
end will be "satisfactory conclusions" and thus ethically sufficient. 134
Overall, the few authorized disclosures that occur during DTC are no
different from disclosures that the legal community has traditionally
recognized as ethical. These disclosures include those in the context of
plea bargaining, probation violations, traffic court ticket negotiations,
family court child support payment negotiations, and probation court fee
payment negotiations.' 3 5 For example, many defendants in child support
court are significantly behind in child support payments. 36 Once brought
into court, defendants would prefer serving a short period of time in jail in
exchange for an extended period of deferred payment rather than paying
money towards their outstanding balance.' 3 7 In each of these cases, the
lawyer is advocating on behalf of the client for a step that may, from an
objective observer, seem damaging to the client's interests but is, in fact, a
position in furtherance of the client's objective. In all of these adversarial
contexts, the lawyer is most often negotiating for the client to serve a brief
time in jail in order to reach a satisfactory outcome for the client-whether

132. N.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R 1.6 cmt. 5.
133. Id.
134. See id. pmbl. 6.
135. Involuntary comifitment cases fall into this category as well. These clients are
arguably different than DTC participants because the medical community traditionally
recognizes them as mentally "impaired," while society has expressed reluctance to accept
substance addiction as a medical disease, as opposed to a self-destructive choice. Lawyers
of these clients are, therefore, given greater flexibility in asserting positions antithetical to
the interests expressed by their client. It is still important, however, to note the similarities
with DTC. In involuntary commitment cases, it is ordinary operating procedure for the
lawyer to negotiate for a step that may, from an objective observer, seem damaging to the
client's interests but is, in fact, a position in furtherance of the client's objective (e.g., to
mentally improve enough to leave the hospital). Interview with Hon. Joseph M. Buckner,
Chief Dist. Court Judge, Orange Cnty., N.C., in Hillsborough, N.C. (Jan. 2, 2013).
136. Id.
137. Id.
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it be more community service, a charge dropped, or a child support
payment deadline pushed back six months.'
C. Prerequisiteof a Guilty Plea is not Per Se Unethical

The opposition's argument further assumes that the DTC plea
agreement requirement is per se unethical. This contention stems from a
suspicion that a client does not "truly know" what benefit she is pleading
guilty for, regardless of whether the defense attorney explains the material
risks, alternative options, and consequences of those options to the client
prior to the plea." 9 This argument for per se unethical waiver of rights
essentially presumes an ever-present collusive motive of DTC team
members. This position overlooks both the necessity of this procedure and
its identical resemblance to the informed waiver of rights and plea
agreement that is traditionally practiced in adversarial proceedings.
First, it is essential to the DTC process that the program participant
settles any lingering procedural requirements from traditional criminal
court. Only after those obligations are settled will a client in DTC be able
to move forward with the therapy, counseling, job placement, and other
program requirements.140 The plea requirement allows the pending charges
to be removed from the prosecutor's docket while treatment for the
offender is pursued.141 Otherwise, various criminal charges would possibly
remain across various courts of jurisdiction, and the associated court dates,
probation hearings, motions, and other requirements would interfere with
both the organization and central purpose of DTC.142 The foreboding,
unknown future of pending criminal charges awaiting the client upon
graduation would deny that individual the fresh legal start that DTC is
43
otherwise so uniquely able to offer.1

138. See Interview with Marie Lamoureaux, Programs and Special Projects Manager for
Orange Cnty. Drug Treatment Court, in Hillsborough, N.C. (Mar. 4, 2013).
139. Quinn, supranote 107, at 54-57.
140. See Interview with Marie Lamoureaux, Programs and Special Projects Manager for
Orange Cnty. Drug Treatment Court, in Hillsborough, N.C. (Mar. 4, 2013).
141. Hora et al., supra note 8, at 515.
142. DTC recognizes that immediacy is key to successful drug treatment. As a result,
DTC procedures are created "to ensure that the court does not 'miss the critical window of
opportunity for intervening and introducing the value of . .. [drug] treatment [into the
defendant's life]."' Id. at 473 (alteration in original) (quoting DEFINING DRUG COURTS,
supra note 7, at 5).
143. The plea also provides the DTC participant with a greater incentive to remain in the
program and to complete treatment. Additionally, it aids in the client's therapy because it
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Moreover, the informed plea agreement requirement is also necessary
for policy reasons. Before electing the DTC program, every participant
faces criminal charges. DTC is an alternative to an extensive prison
sentence-not a substitute for the criminal law of North Carolina. 144If
guilty, the law dictates that the individual must be held accountable for the
illegal actions. DTC allows North Carolina to hold the guilty party
responsible for his actions while simultaneously providing treatment,
reducing the likelihood of repeat offenses, and protecting the surrounding
community.14
The guilty plea prerequisite, therefore, is not functionally different
from the informed plea requirement of adversarial proceedings, such as
arbitration or criminal trials. In both contexts, a criminal defendant may be
required to waive the right to testify, the right to a speedy trial, or the right
to appeal a plea bargain.14 6 Significantly, the "waiver of certain rights is
not a new concept to the criminal justice system,"l 4 7 especially in those
proceedings that are voluntary.
CONCLUSION

The adjudicative structuring of North Carolina's Drug Treatment
Court does not demand a refashioning of the role of a lawyer in order to
secure success of the court. Yet, the reception of DTC among the state's
legal communities varies from adamant approval, to half-hearted support,
to firm opposition. The legal community's divergent receptions of DTC
are not due to any alleged inherent ethical implications within its
collaborative structure. The opponents' narrow definitions of legal ethical
obligations are incompatible with the NCRPC and ignore the fact that the
allegedly unethical components of DTC are no different from those

forces the participant "to accept her addiction and ... overcome denial" via a public
admission to drug use. Hora et al., supra note 8, at 516.
144. For a discussion of the relationship between the concept of "criminal responsibility"
and common understandings of just punishment, see Stephen J. Schulhofer, Just Punishment
In an Imperfect World Questioning Authority: Justice and Criminal Law, 87 MICH. L. REv.
1263 (1989). In a few North Carolina DTCs, however, there is not even a plea requirement.
See Interview with Marie Lamoureaux, Programs and Special Projects Manager for Orange
Cnty. Drug Treatment Court, in Hillsborough, N.C. (Mar. 4, 2013). Conditioned on the
successful completion of DTC, the district attorney's office agrees to withdraw or even
dismiss the charge. Id.
145. See Hora et al., supra note 8, at 521.
146. Id.
147. Id.
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traditional components of adversarial proceedings that have long been
recognized by the legal community as ethical.
Instead, the cause of hesitation and opposition is the long-standing
reluctance by the legal community to directly deal with substance abuse
and its accompanying social stigma. This resistance to embrace DTC can
best be understood in three main flavors: (1) as a result of the legal
profession's own issues with substance abuse; (2) the fact that the label of
"therapeutic court" is essentially a dirty word to some, due to a lack of
understanding of the court's structure and misconception of its goals; and
(3) social misconceptions concerning the nature of addiction.
First, it is no secret that members of the legal profession suffer some
of the highest rates of drug and alcohol abuse compared to almost any other
career field.148 The incredibly long work hours, high stress situations, and
constant juggling of family, career, and day-to-day life have led many
lawyers to self-medicate through drugs and alcohol. 14 9 Although North
Carolina has established several lawyer assistance programs in an attempt
to encourage lawyers to discuss their struggles with addiction and receive
treatment,150 the substance abuse dilemma is mostly unspoken of.151 In the
specific context of DTC, the legal profession as a whole is faced with a
judicial structure with the sole function of treating substance abuse and
directly dealing with all of its accompanying evils: unemployment,
emotional and mental instability, financial insolvency, poor social skills,
etc.152 Perhaps some of the legal profession's hesitance to accept such a

148. See Laura Rothstein, Law Students andLawyers with Mental Health and Substance
Abuse Problems: Protectingthe Public and the Individual, 69 U. PITT. L. REV. 531, 531-33
(2008).
141 id
150. See BARCARES, http://www.barcares.org (last visited May 1, 2013); NORTH
http://www.nclap.org (last visited May 1, 2013).
151. As indicated by a North Carolina Bar Association study, almost 17% of new North
Carolina attorneys consume three to five alcoholic drinks a day. N.C. BAR Ass'N, REPORT
OF THE QUALITY OF LIFE TASK FORCE AND RECOMMENDATIONS 4 (June 20, 1991), available
at http://www.ncbar.org/media/l1638328/leqlreportl991.pdf; see also Frank Newton, The
Twenty-Third Edward H. Young Lecture in Legal Education: Legal Education and
Professionalism in ParallelUniverses, 160 MIL. L. REV. 223, 230 (1999) ("Rarely do we
notice or publicize professionals and other white-collar drug abusers who have much easier
access to controlled substances."); Rothstein, supra note 148, at 533 ("Because of the high
stakes involved in the legal profession and the stigma attached to mental illness and
substance abuse problems, individuals with these problems are often reluctant to seek
help.").
152. JOYCE H. LowINsoN, SUBSTANCE ABUSE: A COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK, 100, 345,
713, 1142-44 (2005).
CAROLINA LAWYER ASSISTANCE PROGRAM,
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court formation is due to its own unwillingness to directly confront and
deal with a problem that has silently infiltrated much of the profession
itself.
Second, another explanation is the misconception of DTC's structure
and goals. In North Carolina counties such as Orange County, where the
DTC enjoys considerable support from the surrounding population and the
local legal community, DTC is treated as a legal "no-brainer." 53 Contrast
this with other North Carolina counties where "therapeutic court" is
deemed a "dirty word" by some legal professionals. Often, leftist social
connotations are associated with any legal proceedings labeled
"therapeutic" or "alternative," and they are viewed as an unwelcome
departure from more socially conservative values such as the preservation
of tradition and custom found in adversarial proceedings.1 54 In conjunction
with this perspective is the misperception that DTC is simply a vehicle for
funneling more money into "people who won't change," either because
sobriety is impossible for them or because, regardless of sobriety, "once a
criminal always a criminal." This socially-charged opposition to DTC
unfortunately leaves only one method intact for dealing with the offenders:
the very expensive decision to continue incarceration of these individuals
while ignoring their substance abuse, mental health, or financial problems
until the point in time that they are re-released back into society.15 5 This

153. It is impressive to note that the Orange County Commissioners decided to fund the
Orange County Drug Treatment Court, even when state funding for the program was cut.
Freda Kahen-Kashi, County Commissioners Keep Drug Courts Alive, CHAPELBORO
MAGAZINE (June 19, 2011); Joe Schwartz, Drug Treatment Courts Get the Budget Axe,
Even Though They Save Money, INDY WEEK NEWSPAPER (June 15, 2011),
http://www.indyweek.com/indyweek/drug-treatment-courts-get-the-budget-ax-even-thoughthey-save-money/Content?oid=2549963.
Mecklenburg County recently made the same
change. See Another Attempt to Kill N.C. Drug Courts, THE CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (May

29, 2012), http://vw.clihrlotteobserver.com/2012/05/29/3268203/another-attempt-to-killnc-drug.html.
154. See Albert P. Cardarelli & Stephen C. Hicks, Radicalism in Law and Criminology:
A Retrospective View of CriticalLegal Studies and Radical Criminology, 84 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 502, 502, 546 (1993); Frank V. Williams, III, Reinventing the Courts: The
Frontiers of Judicial Activism in the State Courts, 29 CAMPBELL L. REV. 591, 594, 639-43
(2007). There is a running joke amongst some North Carolina judges that a few of the
state's court systems are "250 years of tradition, unimpeded by progress." See Interview
with Hon. Joseph M. Buckner, Chief Dist. Court Judge, Orange Cnty., N.C., in
Hillsborough, N.C. (Jan. 2,2013).
155. Although some minimal treatment is provided in North Carolina's prisons, as much
as 75% of inmates identified as needing substance abuse treatment are nonetheless not
treated. Justice and Redemption (WRAL television broadcast Oct. 9, 2012). The cost of
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attitude of "perhaps if we ignore it, it will just go away" alternative does
little for either the public welfare or society's pocket book.
Moreover, prejudicial social misconceptions of addiction further
provide an explanation for the legal community's hesitance to embrace
DTC. Over time, addiction has been given numerous definitions,156 none
of which have resulted in a universally accepted answer. Due to social
misconceptions about the nature of addiction,' 5 7 society has historically
stigmatized addiction as a disorder within one's own self-control, as
opposed to a true disability or disease. 58 "Political 'policies have branded
these unfortunate individuals as the outcasts of society and forced them
unnecessarily to lives of crime and degradation."" 5 9 Perhaps the most
helpful definition of "addiction" for DTC is: "the act of continuing the
same behavior in the face of repetitive and subsequent negative
consequences of that behavior."16 0 In order to break the constant cycle of
addiction, the causal sources of the behavior must be addressed and
eradicated.' 6 ' Judgmental presumptions about the nature of the addicts'
substance abuse, therefore, must be overcome in order for the community
to stop stigmatizing the addict as an outcast and instead begin focusing on
the addict's treatment opportunities.
Furthermore, establishing a DTC is not an attempt to force every
lawyer in the area to work within its structure-quite the contrary. A
lawyer who is suspicious of addiction, as well as the treatment that seeks to
overcome it, is detrimental to the very core of the DTC objective. A DTC
client will never be able to reach sobriety if the lawyer does not think that
putting an offender through North Carolina's DTC program is only a fraction of the
approximated $28,000 it costs the state to keep an offender in prison for one year. Id.
156. Hora et al., supra note 8, at 451 ("The term 'addiction,' like the words 'drug' and
'addict,' does not have a universally accepted definition. 'Attempts at a unified theory of
addiction have long been frustrated."').
157. Nicole Fiocco, The Unpopular Disabled: Drug Addicts and Alcoholics Lose
Benefits, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 1007, 1017 (1997).
158. Charles Dackis et al., Neurobiology of Addiction: Treatment and Public Policy
Ramifications, 8 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 1431, 1436 (2005).
159. Geoffrey R. Stone, A PassionFor Justice, 98 YALE L.J. 213, 217 (1988) (quoting
United States v. Moore, 486 F.2d 1139, 1229 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Wright, J., dissenting)).
160. This definition is almost identical to the definition adopted by the American Society
of Addiction Medicine: "a disease process characterized by the continued use of a specific
psychoactive substance despite physical, psychological or social harm . . . major behavior
characteristics: preoccupation . . . compulsive use . .. relapse." Norman S. Miller et al., The

Relationship of Addiction, Tolerance and Dependence on - Alcohol and Drugs: A
NeurochemicalApproach, 4 J. OF SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT 197, 199 (1987).
16 1. Id.

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2014

29

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 3 [2014], Art. 5

396

CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:367

the client is worthy of sobriety or if the lawyer does not think that sobriety
is attainable.1 62 As Chief District Court Judge of Orange County, Judge
Buckner, articulates: "the focus [of DTC] must be on a skill set. Not all
lawyers have to do this. You need people who understand addiction to
make DTC effective."l 6 3
In sum, the long-standing hesitance by the legal community to directly
deal with substance addiction best accounts for why there is opposition to
DTC. This explanation best addresses why resistance among the legal
community remains, despite the fact that much of the DTC structure
mirrors ethical adversarial adjudicative framework and complies with the
legal ethics standards governing North Carolina's lawyers.16 4 The crux of
the opposition argument to DTC is truly rooted in social misconceptions
rather than legal reasoning.
This Comment implores North Carolina's legal community to
reexamine its perspective on North Carolina's Drug Treatment Courts.
Therapeutic justice is a newly emerging field of law that is deserving of
attention and has already proven to be effective in the state.16
As
highlighted in Part I of this Comment, DTC saves the government and
taxpayers money, deters future crime by treating the underlying issues that
trigger individual repeat offenders, reduces the overall crime rate, protects
community citizens against becoming potential victims, reduces drug use in
the area, and produces sober and productive community members through
work placement programs and community service.' 6 6 It would be a
disservice to the people of North Carolina to allow the profession's
wariness of directly dealing with substance abuse to impede the vast
financial and social benefits of North Carolina's Drug Treatment Courts.
Lily Van Patten

162. See BEST PRACTICES, supra note 12, at 10-11.
163. Interview with Hon. Joseph M. Buckner, Chief Dist. Court Judge, Orange Cnty.,
N.C., in Hillsborough, N.C. (Jan. 2, 2013).
164. Such comparable adjudicative framework includes plea bargaining, traffic court
speeding ticket negotiations, family court child support payment negotiations, and probation
court fee payment negotiations. Id.
165. LAKE & WALKER, supra note 3, at 32.
166. See id.; Drug Courts Work, NAT'L AsS'N

OF

DRUG

COURT

PROF'LS,

http://www.nadcp.org/learn/facts-and-figures (last visited May 1, 2013); RECOvERYNC,
www.recoverync.org (last visited May 1, 2013).

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol35/iss3/5

30

